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USE AND MISUSE OF DISCOVERY PROCEDURE
PHILIP S. VAN CISE
of the Denver Bar

A surprising number of lawyers go into court half prepared
and without taking depositions. A soldier wins his battle with
ammunition; a lawyer wins his case with facts. The discovery
procedure produces the facts which win the case and shorten the
trial. Discovery also greatly aids settlement out of court.
A client gives you his side of the story which looks like a good
case. But there are two sides to every case, and the other side may
be much stronger.
How can you get all the possible facts? You talk to your client
and his witnesses and examine his papers. If haste is necessary,
you often file your case before this examination is completed. But
you need to use the Discovery Rules to find out what is the defendant's side.
Three times, after taking a deposition, I have found that I
had a very weak case and promptly dismissed the action. I much
prefer to lose a case on depositions in the office rather than on a
trial in court. As against that I have won many cases by getting
the adverse party committed to answers in his depositions.
The first question we face is when should depositions be
taken. The answer is at the earliest possible moment after you
fully know what questions you want answered. Don't take a
deposition on guess work.
WHEN CAN DEPOSITIONS BE TAKEN

In Colorado, under our Rules and without leave of court, you
can serve notice to take the deposition at the same time as you
serve the summons, and you can fix whatever date you desire in
the notice. We think this is excellent procedure.
However, Federal Rule 26 as amended in March, 1949, provides:
After commencement of the action the deposition
may be taken without leave of court, except that leave
granted with or without notice, must be obtained if notice of the taking is served by the plaintiff within 20
days after commencement of the action. (Italics supplied.)
Note there are no limitations placed on the defendant. This
Rule and the reasons for it are well stated in Keller-Dorian Color
Film v. Eastman Kodak Company.1
Two cases were filed. The defendant was represented by the
firm of Donovan, Leisure et al, of New York, and their contention
was that depositions should not be taken until issue was joined
'9 F.R.D. 432 (S.D. N.Y. August, 1949).
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and then only after the defendant had first taken the depositions
of officers of the plaintiff. The court ruled to the contrary and
stated:
Plaintiff filed its complaints in these actions on November 19, 1948 and on the same day obtained an ex parte
order from.., this Court, granting plaintiff leave to serve
simultaneously with the service of its complaints notice to
take the deposition of two of defendant's officers. On the
same day (November 19, 1948) the complaints, ex parte
orders and the notices of examination were served on the
defendant. The examinations were noticed for December
15 and 16, 1948.
Note that the date set for taking the deposition was 26 days
after the date of filing and service. Defendant entered its appearance November 30. The court also stated:
Under Rule 26(a), before amendment . . . it was
generally held that priority went to the party first serving the notice for examination.
This gave a practical advantage to the defendant
who would normally and naturally serve the notice to
take the deposition with the answer.
The report of the Advisory Committee on Amendments to the Rules . . . indicates an intent to broaden
the former Rule so that now either party may start taking
depositions after the complaint is served but with a 20-day
delay period against the plaintiff (except by order of the
Court), and this only as the note says because it is a
protection for a defendant who has not had an opportunity to retain counsel and inform himself of the nature of
the suit.
I believe that the Rule makers . . . intended that the
plaintiff should go to Court for leave so that the Court
might protect such a defendant, one without an attorney
and one who was not informed of the nature of the proceeding.
This defendant did not need the protection of the
Court in those respects. It had attorneys and it appeared
in the action before the expiration of the 20 days and
about two weeks before the date set for the taking of
the deposition.
Therefore bear this in mind if you are the plaintiff. When
you file your complaint without notice to the defendant, you can
apply to the court for leave to take depositions at any date after
20 days after you serve the defendant, and you can serve that
notice with the summons and complaint and a copy of the order.
Then you are sure that you can take the first deposition, because
the party who serves the first notice to take a deposition of the
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other party or of a witness has priority, and it is of the utmost
value that you and your client hear or read his opponent's testimony before the adverse party takes your client's deposition.

RULE 26 (b) SCOPE OF EXAMINATION
This provision is very broad; "Unless otherwise ordered by the
court . . . the deponent may be examined regarding any matter,
not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in
the pending action.., including the existence, description, nature,
custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other
tangible things and the identity and location of persons having
knowledge of relevant facts." But don't use this to ask all sorts
of useless and needless questions.
You can introduce the whole or part of the deposition of an
adverse party or of an officer of an adverse corporation party
without being bound by it just the same as if he were called as an
adverse witness at the trial. But if only part of any deposition is
introduced, you may be required to introduce all of it which is
relevant to the part introduced. A very important point to remember is that you are not deemed to make a person your witness
for any purpose by taking his deposition. Another point to remember is that at the trial you may rebut any relevant evidence
contained in a deposition whether introduced by you or any other
party. This differs from attempting to contradict your own witness
who testifies at the trial.
27 DEPOSITIONS BEFORE ACTION OR PENDING APPEAL
This Rule gives the procedure to perpetuate testimony. As a
matter of form it should be amended so that a motion should be
filed instead of a petition. The Rule is seldom invoked but is very
necessary in many instances.
A case must be filed in the United States District Court in
the residence of any expected adverse party. Hence if there are
several adverse parties, resident in different districts, separate
actions must be brought in each district. Proper service is required upon each person named in the petition, and if any parties
are not properly served the Court shall appoint an attorney to
represent them.
However, this Rule is not involved in our discussion as the
courts have held that it may not be used for2 discovery purposes
to enable the petitioner to frame a complaint.
RULE

RULE 28 PERSONS BEFORE WHOM DEPOSITIONS MAY BE TAKEN

The Rule provides that "no deposition shall be taken before
a person who is a relative or employee or attorney or counsel of
any of the parties, or is financially interested in the action." However, in some of the smaller towns where notary stenographers
are scarce, counsel very frequently stipulated that it can be taken
22 Federal Rules Digest 4.
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by the secretary of one of the attorneys, and this, of course, waives
the Rule.
Also, in some of these places, it often happens that the local
County or State District Judges take depositions in cases pending
before them, but I have found no case where our Federal Judges
have done so although they have that power. They are too busy to
do so, and it would be bad practice to start it.
In case of a deposition in foreign countries the Rule should
be strictly followed so that the proper authority is selected to take
the deposition. A few lawyers have been fortunate enough to
have estates or other litigation which required a trip, at the
client's expense, to other countries to take depositions on oral
interrogatories. As one of the unlucky ones who never had that
chance, I have been rather skeptical when oral interrogatories
have then been requested.
PLACE WHERE DEPOSITIONS CAN BE TAKEN

There is a distinction as to the place where the deposition of
a party and the deposition of a witness may be taken on oral
interrogatories. Rule 45 provides:
d (2) A resident of the district in which the deposition is to be taken may be required to attend an examination only in the county wherein he resides or is employed
or transacts his business in person, or at such other convenient place as is fixed by an order of court. A nonresident of the district may be required to attend only
in the county wherein he is served with a subpoena, or
within 40 miles from the place of service or at such other
convenient place as is fixed by an order of court.
Hence if you subpoena a party for oral examination at a
deposition, you are limited to the places stated in Rule 45.
Note, however, that it is only when a subpoena is served upon
a party that the place of taking his deposition is limited by Rule 45.
No subpoena is necessary for the attendance of a party, or of an
officer of a defendant corporation if notice to take his deposition
is served upon him or his attorney.
Now let us examine Rule 5; it provides:
(a) . . . every written notice . . . shall be served
upon each of the parties affected thereby ...
(b) Whenever ... service is required . . . to be made
upon a party represented by an attorney the service shall
be made upon the attorney unless service upon the party
himself is ordered by the court.
How about Rule 30, which provides:
(a) Notice of Examination: Time and Place.
A party desiring to take the deposition of any per-
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son upon oral examination shall give reasonable notice in
writing to every other party to the action. The notice
shall state the time and place for taking the deposition
and the name and address of each person to be examined. (Italics supplied).
(b) Orders for the protection of parties and deponents.
After notice is served for taking a deposition by
oral examination, upon motion seasonably made by any
party or by the person to be examined and upon notice
and for good cause shown, the court in which the action
is pending may make an order that the deposition shall
not be taken, or that it may be taken only at some designated place other than that stated in the notice .
(Italics supplied).
How have the United States Courts construed Rules 5 and 30
as to taking the deposition of a party after being served with
notice ?
I cite a few cases: Notice was served on defendant's counsel
that defendant's deposition would be taken at Bangor, Maine, his
place of residence in the district where he lived. He did not appear. The Court held that he could not be compelled to attend without a subpoena but that he could be subjected to the penalties under
Rule 37 (d) for wilfully failing to attend when he was one of the
parties and that he had been properly notified. 3 In a New York
district court case defendants did not appear on a notice to have
their depositions taken, and the Court held they could be penalized
by striking out their answer.4
In a libel case the plaintiff failed
to appear for a deposition on which notice had been served on his
attorneys. He was in India, and did not come to New York for
the deposition. The case was dismissed.5 A resident of Oregon
brought an action in Arizona. Notice to take his deposition in
Phoenix where the action was filed, was disregarded. He raised
the question of no subpoena, but the Court held none was required
and dismissed his case.6
There are many other decisions to the same effect, and we
have found none to the contrary. Therefore, notice to a party to take
his deposition can be relied upon as sufficient if served upon him
ar his attorney, and no subpoena is required.
WHERE CAN You TAKE THE DEPOSITION OF

A PARTY

The Federal decisions are very much in conflict, some holding it must be at the place where the action was filed, others allow
'Millinocket v. Kurson, 35 F. Sup. 754 (D. Me. 1940).
v. Zalstem, 1 F.R.D. 240 (S.D. N.Y. 1940).
5 Roerich v. Esquire Coronet, 1 F.R.D. 692 (S.D. N.Y. 1941).
1 Collins v. Wayland, 139 F. 2d 677 (9th Cir. 1944), Certiorari denied 88 L.
4,d. 1576.
4French
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it at the town of the party or place of business of a corporation.
I cite a few illustrative cases requiring the deposition to be taken
where the case was filed: A Cuban corporation brought an action
in the New York District Court. The decision is by the Second
Circuit Court. The president of the plaintiff corporation was ordered to appear with its books and records for his deposition in
New York, and for his failure to appear the case was dismissed. 7
A plaintiff who brings suit in a particular district must appear
and give his deposition there., A resident of Chicago brought $100,000 suit in New York; required to give deposition in New York.,
Non-resident plaintiff required to give his deposition where the
suit was pending unless showing of special hardship made. 10 Plaintiff required to give his deposition where case is pending, even
though he had removed to another state." A Canadian corporation with its office in Vancouver, British Columbia, sued the defendant for breach of contract in New York. Notice was served
by defendant to take the deposition of plaintiff's officers in New
York. Held that the deposition would be taken in New York
except that at plaintiff's option it could be taken in Canada, conditioned on the payment by plaintiff
of the expenses and reason12
able counsel fees of defendant.
Here are some cases to the contrary: Plaintiff was without
funds, had lost both legs, was not required to go to New York,
but deposition was ordered taken at Minneapolis, where he lived
or by written interrogatories.' 3 The plaintiff was ordered to come
to New York from Florida on condition that defendant pay his
costs and traveling expenses or that it be taken in Florida if defendant pay plaintiff's counsel's travel and hotel expenses; otherwise by written interrogatories. 4 There are also many opinions
that deposition of corporate officers be taken at its place of business.' 5
Hence under Rule 30 the place of taking the deposition where
the action is pending is subject to modification by the court if
good cause is shown therefor. As a result the place for taking a
party's deposition on notice is wide open, and the party who objects to that place should at once file his motion to change thE
place and state very good and complete reasons therefor. Then il
is entirely up to the court where and under what conditions it will
be taken.
' Producers Releasing Corporation of Cuba v. P.R.C. Pictures, 176 F. 2d 9:
(2nd Cir. 1949).
8 Petnel v. Am. T. & T., 16 F.R. Ser. 396 (S.D. N.Y. 1952).
'Worth v. Trans. World Films, 11 F.RD. 197 (S.D. N.Y. 1951).
10Zweifler v. Sleco Laces 11, F.R.D. 202 (S.D. N.Y. 1950).
"Anthony v. R.K.O. Radio, 8 F.R.D. 422 (S.D. N.Y. 1948).
"Morrison Export Co. v. Goldstone, 12 F.R.D. 258 (S.D. N.Y. 1952).
"Sullivan v. So. Pac. Co., 7 F.R.D. 206 (S.D. N.Y. 1947).
1"Stevens v. Minder Construction Corp., 3 F.R.D. 498 (S.D. N.Y. 1943).
"Article by J. H. McChord, 4 F.R.D. 374.
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RULE 29 STIPULATION ON DEPOSITIONS

More and more attorneys are stipulating as to the time and
place of taking depositions, and they are usually held in the office
of the attorney who is taking them. My experience is always to
be obliging to other counsel and agree on a time and place for the
deposition and the production of documents without requiring it
in writing. Then we dictate the stipulation at the start of the
deposition.
In defending a libel case brought by a very belligerent lawyer
who gets very personal, my defendant's deposition was to be
taken before a shorthand reporter. So as to get the shouting and
yelling of the opposing attorney in the record, I employed an additional reporter with a wire-recorder to get this data for the Court,
just as it sounded at the deposition in case I discontinued the
deposition. We started rather late in the morning, and he yelled
and shouted and called names as I expected. I was about to take
my client and leave, but decided to come back after lunch. When
I did, my reporter told me the wire-recorder had failed to register.
But luck was with me, his associate attorney showed up with him,
apologized and we finished the deposition.
RULE

31

DEPOSITIONS ON WRITTEN INTERROGATORIES

Where the client is poor, the witness is at a distance or the
interrogatories are short, written interrogatories should be used.
Care should be taken that they fully cover all possible facts, and as
a rule they should be shown to the client before they are served.
It is wise to use this general question at the end of the deposition:
Have you fully stated all the facts that you know
about the matters on which you have been questioned?
If not, state them now.
However, oral interrogatories are preferable to written interrogatories.
32 EFFECT OF ERROR AND IRREGULARITIES
In brief this Rule requires prompt objection to errors in the
notice to the officer taking the deposition, to errors and irregularities at the deposition, to the form of the written interrogatories
and to the completion and return of the deposition. If not made
in time, all are waived.
When I take a deposition if it is necessary to save expense,
I stipulate with counsel that the deposition does not have to be
filed until the trial; but can be delivered to me, and can be examined at any time by the adverse party. If my client is not short
of funds, I much prefer to have my copy in the office and the
original filed in Court.
RULE

33 INTERROGATORIES To PARTIES
Note, this Rule is limited to parties only and is not applicable

RULE
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to witnesses. This Rule was very properly amended so that both
depositions and interrogatories may be used. The only limitation
is that:
interrogatories may be served after commencement of
the action and without leave of court, except that, if
service is made by the plaintiff within 10 days after such
commencement, leave of Court granted with or without
notice must first be obtained.
The number of interrogatories to be served is not
limited except as justice requires to protect a party from
annoyance, expense, embarrassment or oppression.
The courts hold that this Rule is as broad as Rule 26, and that
it is limited only by rules of relevancy.
The leading case under this Rule is Hickman v. Taylor. 6 While
this reversed the Circuit Court, it very thoroughly analyzed the
Rule and should be carefully studied by every lawyer who has
problems as to what interrogatories he can ask. The case states
the following:
Disclosure by an adverse party's counsel of information gathered by him in anticipation of possible litigation
may not be required by interrogatories ...
A party cannot refuse to answer interrogatories on
the ground that the information sought is solely within
the knowledge of his attorney.
The deposition-discovery rules (Nos. 27-37) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are to be accorded a
broad and liberal treatment, to the end that either party
may obtain in advance of trial knowledge of all relevant
facts in possession of the other.
Memoranda made by an attorney while acting for his
client in anticipation of litigation, of information secured
from witnesses, brief, communications and other writings
prepared by him for his own use in prosecuting his client's
case, and writings which reflect his mental impressions,
conclusions, opinions or legal theories, are outside the
scope of the attorney-client privilege and hence are not
protected from discovery on that basis.
A party is not entitled to discovery under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure of written statements in the files
of the attorney for the adverse party and of memoranda
made by him in anticipation of litigation, without any
showing of the necessity for the production of such material or any demonstration that denial of production would
cause hardship or injustice, where for aught that appears
the essence of what he seeks either has been revealed to
16329 U.S. 495 (1947).
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him through interrogatories or is readily available to him
direct from the witnesses for the asking..
Without a showing of necessity, the attorney for an
adverse party should not be required to disclose to his
opponent his mental impressions or memoranda as to oral
statements made to him by witnesses equally available to
the other party, and it is not enough that such party's
counsel wants the statements to help prepare himself to
examine witnesses and to make sure that he has overlooked nothing.
Rules 31, on written interrogatories to witness and 33 on
interrogatories to parties have this distinction: Rule 31 is a deposition on which cross and redirect interrogatories can be asked
the same as at a trial, Rule 33, being limited to parties, gets the
answers just to the questions you ask without explanations of any
kind and therefore, if the questions are very carefully framed
and not made too long, it is the better practice as to parties. The
answers are definite commitments and are very helpful in narrowing the issues and thus shortening the trial.
The difficulty with this Rule is that many lawyers ask a
tremendous number of trivial and unimportant questions. The
adverse party can file written objections within ten days, and a
lot of needless time of court and counsel is then consumed.
If the court's docket is crowded, and the lawyers do not live
at the place where the court has its sessions, the adverse party can
thus greatly delay the trial. The court should not hesitate to censure the counsel who wrote improper interrogatories or asked too
many trivial questions and also to censure the other attorney for
illegal objections. If the questions and objections are very long,
the attorneys should be first told to get together and try to shorten
them and thus save the time of the court.
If you use this Rule, first check the court docket and then
check with your adversary lawyer. If both are satisfactory, use
Rule 33; otherwise use Rule 31 (written interrogatories) or preferably Rule 30 (oral interrogatories). Don't overlook the fact that
if you want more information than you got under Rule 33, you can
then take the deposition by oral or written interrogatories.
COSTS OF DEPOSITIONS

Rule 54(d) provides: "Except when express provisions therefor are made either in a statute of the United States or in these
rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party
unless the court otherwise directs." Under all the U. S. decisions
the taxation of costs under this Rule has been held to be in the
discretion of the Court. 17
We have found only three Federal cases on deposition costs:
'

2 Federal Rules Digest 261-263.
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The taxation of expenses in taking depositions as
costs is a matter within the court's discretion under Rule
54(d) and as confirmed by Rule 80(a) and the court's
action will not be overruled except for an abuse of discretion."'
Costs may be taxed for the expenses of a deposition,
the use of which became unnecessary as the result of a
pre-trial hearing. 19
Where a local rule provides that expenses of taking a
deposition shall be taxable as costs only if the deposition
was read or offered in evidence, the 20costs of taking a
deposition not used may not be taxed.
Colorado, in the main, adopted the Federal Rules in 1941.
Ten years later -in a case won by us, Morris v. Redak,21 the Colorado Supreme Court unanimously and very vigorously, and in my
opinion very wrongly, modified that portion of the decree of the
district court which allowed the costs of taking the deposition of
the defendant and stated:
Taking depositions of witnesses in preparation for
trial is something in the nature of a luxury, and one who
avails himself of this procedure does so at his own expense.
The deposition of the defendant which we took in that case
was the main factor which resulted in a judgment for our client
of over $50,000. The deposition costs were $375.70. Hence we did
not file any motion for reconsideration against that part of the
judgment although we then thought, and still think, that it was
thoroughly improper and rendered without any conception of the
fact that in most cases a lawyer who fails to take depositions is
not doing his job. In that case the defendant on direct examination
repeatedly testified differently from his deposition. It was a jury
case, and time after time on cross-examination he was contradicted
by statements in his deposition.
We hope that the Colorado Supreme Court will some time
amend its Rules to provide that costs of depositions shall be in the
discretion of the court. The Denver District Court Rules had previously so provided.
Abraham Lincoln told a story about the steamboat. Everytime the whistle blew it took all the steam and the boat came to
a standstill. The reverse is true by the new procedure; the whistle
of discovery has been the signal for the advance of the boat, and
it has enabled the boat to delivery the case at its destination.
Harris v. Twentieth Century Fox, 139 F. (2d) 571 (2nd Cir. 1943).
"Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Fruit Growers Service Co., 2 F.R.D. 131
(E.D. Wash 1941).
oAmerman v. ]Butte Copper Co., 5 F.R.D. 30 (D. Mont. 1945).
124 Colo. 27, 234 P. 2d 908 (1951).
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COMMENTS ON RULE 34
ROBERT 0. VAUGHAN*
of the Nevada Bar

The enactment of a statute is often the starting point of
litigation to construe the meaning of the wording, phrasing, paragraphs, and often the entire statute. The various rules of civil
procedure have had this court treatment since their adoption by
the federal courts and the several state courts, and Rule 34 1 which
pertains to discovery and production of documents and things for
inspection, copying, or photographing is one of the most litigated
rules.
Parts of Rule 34 2 pertinent to this comment are:
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor and upon notice to all other parties, the court in
which an action is pending may (1) order any party to
produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any
designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters,
photographs, objects, or tangible things, not privileged,
which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his possession,
custody, or control; or . . . The order shall specify the
time, place, and manner of making the inspection and taking the copies and photographs and may prescribe such
terms and conditions as are just.
The wording of the above rule has caused recurrence of the
old controversy between the basic general principle that evidence
should be made known to all parties and that considerations of
the general good impose certain restraints upon the invasion of
files and papers of attorneys. This controversy has arisen because
of the necessity of producing signed statements of parties and
witnesses to an accident in many cases, and recently the Colorado
Supreme Court had occasion to make a decision on the point with
regard to a statement signed by a party.
In McCoy v. District Court of Larimer County 3 it was held
that Rule 34 4 does not give the plaintiff in an action for damages
for personal injuries an unqualified right to examine a statement
signed by him and delivered to the defendant during an investigation conducted prior to the time suit was filed, and that, in the
absence of a showing of good cause, defendant's attorney was not
required to produce the statement. There was no indication in
* Written while a student at the University of Denver College of Law.

Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Ibid.
3Advance Sheet, August 22, 1952, 246 P. 2d 619.
4
Colo. R. C. P.
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the opinion that the rule would be otherwise in the case of a statement of a witness to an accident.
The decision in McCoy v. District Court of Larimer County,
supra, is in accord with the majority of decisions on the point
under Federal Rule 34. Although a few early Federal District
Court decisions held that there need not be a showing of good
cause, 5 and one case did not require a showing of good cause because the statement was not taken by the defendant's attorney,
the majority of those, lower court decisions are to the effect that
good cause must be shown to require the defendant's attorney to
produce the plaintiff's statement or a witness' statement. 7 Since
the three major cases of Martin v. Capitol Transit Co.,s Safeway

Stores, Inc. v. Reynolds,9 and Alimont v. United States,10 decisions from the Court of Appeals have consistently held that a
showing of good cause was necessary. The Colorado Supreme
Court cited Martin v. Capitol Transit Co., supra, with approval
and the rule expressed in that case is as follows:
Rule 34 authorizes the District Court to order production of documents, papers, etc., upon motion of a party
"showing good cause" not upon a mere allegation or
recitation that good cause exists. The rule contemplates
an exercise of judgment by the court, not mere automatic
granting of a motion. The court's judgment is to be
moved by a demonstration by the moving party of its
need, for the purpose of the trial, of the document or
paper sought.
Nearly all of the Federal cases cite the famous case of Hickman v.
Taylor" as supporting the theory of a required showing of good
cause.
The decisions in code states on the point set down the general
rule that the statements are part of the attorney's
work and are
not subject to discovery by the opposite party. 12 However, under
5Tague v. Delaware L & W. R. Co., 5 F.R.D. 337; Kershner v. Palmer, 7
F.R.D. 252.
6DeBruce v. The Pennsylvania R. Co., 6 F.R.D. 403.
1 Stark v. American Dredging Co. 3 F.R.D. 300; Gordon v. The Pennsylvania
R. Co. 5 F.R.D. 510; Nedemeyer v. The Pennsylvania R. Co. 6 F.R.D. 21; Hanke
v. Milwaukee Electric Railway and Transport Co. 7 F.R.D. 540; Hoffman v.
Chesapeake & 0. R. Co. 7 F.R.D. 574; Berger v. Central Vermont Ry Inc. 8
F.R.D. 419; Reeves v. The Pennsylvania R. Co. 8 F.R.D. 616; Bennett v. New
York Cent. R. Co. 9 F.R.D. 17; Hudalla v. Chicago M. S. P. & P . R. Co. 10 F.R.D.
363 (cited by the Colorado Supreme Court) ; Brauner v. United States 10 F.R.D.
468.
8170 F. 2d 811.
9176 F. 2d 476.
"0177 F. 2d 971.
"' 329 U.S. 495, 67 S. Ct. 385, 91 L. Ed. 451.
2Missouri
Pacific R. Co. v. Hall, 325 Mo. 102, 27 S.W. 2d 1027; Sack v. All
States Holding Corp., 268 Appl. Div. 793, 49 NYS 2d 148; Scavone v. Bush, 84
NYS 2d 40.
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special circumstancesi discovery of such statements has been allowed. 13 It appears that the special circumstances under which
discovery was allowed would constitute a showing of good cause
that would allow discovery under Rule 34.
The decision in McCoy v. District Court of Larimer County,
supra, raises the question as to what would constitute a showing
of good cause sufficient to require production of the statements.
The only clue in the court's opinion is in the following paragraph
wherein the court was speaking of the facts in the case at hand:
There is no suggestion that the declarant in each
statement was not in full possession of his faculties when
the instrument was signed, nor is there any reason given
why his present version of the facts would differ from
that contained in the written statement.
Keeping the court's comment in mind, we should note that in
Walsh v. Northland Greyhound Lines, Inc.,14 it was held that
there was sufficient reason for discovery when it was alleged that
the person making the statement was under sedatives at the
time, that she was questioned until exhausted and that she believed the statement contained inaccurate information. In Bearor
v. Kapple 15 discovery was allowed when plaintiff stated that he
was ill when the statement was taken, that he was coerced with
threats of being put in jail if he didn't sign the statement, and
that he did not read the statement he signed. The court held that
discovery was proper in Toflegaard v. Hart 16 upon a showing
that defendant's agent coerced the plaintiff into signing the statement without an opportunity to read the statement, and plaintiff
did not receive a copy of the statement. On plaintiff's affidavit that
he had grounds for believing the statement had been fraudulently
altered the court allowed discovery in Nedemeyer v. The Pennsylvania R. Co. 17 In a suit against the United States for damages
arising out of a military plane crash it was held that the nature
of the accident, the difficulty of obtaining information as to the
cause of the accident, lapse of time and the fact that the witness
in military service was good cause for allowing diswas still
8
covery.'
On the other hand, discovery of the statements have been
denied for failure to show good cause under the. circumstances of
the following cases. Several cases 19 have denied discovery where
the only cause shown was that the person who made the statement
1,Walsh v. Northland Greyhound Lines, 244 Wis. 281, 12 N.W. 2d 20; Tofle.
gaard v. Hart, 100 NYS 2d 729; Bearor v. Kapple. 24 NYS 2d 655.
"4244 Wis. 281, 12 N.W. 2d 20.
24 NYS 2d 655.
100 NYS 2d 729.
"6 F.R.D. 21.
Brauner v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 468.
"Scavone v. Bush, 84 NYS 2d 40; Croteau v. Belden, 30 NYS 2d 315; Hudalla
v. Chicago M. S. P. & P. R. Co., 10 F.R.D. 363.
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could not remember the contents of the statement. A desire on
the part of the attorney to know what his adversaries or their
clients believe to be the true facts was held not "good cause" in
Havrisko v. United States.20 The allegation that the statement
was necessary to refresh recollection and avoid giving testimony
at variance with the statement was held as insufficient good cause
to warrant discovery. 21 Two cases have held that there cannot
be discovery of the statements without a showing that the witnesses are unavailable,2 2 and the fact that witnesses were in another state and the costs of taking their depositions was held not
to be good cause in the cases of Berger v. Central
Vermont Ry.,
2 41
Inc.," and Reeves v. The Pennsylvania R. Co.

068 F. Supp. 771.
"' 49 NYS 2d 650.
2 Bennett v. New York Central
R, Co., 9 F.R.D. 17; Hanke v. Milwaukee
Electric Ry and Transport Co., 7 I .R.D. 540.
'3 8 F.R.D. 419.
S8F.R.D. 616.

BAR ADMISSIONS
The following information has been provided by the National
Conference of Bar Examiners and may be of interest to Dicta
readers:

Colorado 1949
1950
1951
1952
48 State
Total
1949
1950
1951
1952

ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR
Ol
By Diploma
Examination
(Rifle 220 A)
193
0
188
0
166
6
129
3
11,773
12,015
11,568
10,465

1,571
1,626
1,573
1,435

O.
Motion
15
16
10
6
573
475
498
555

Total
208
204
182
138
13,344
13,641
13,141
11,900

FATALITY RATE ON BAR EXAMINATIONS DURING 1952
Took Bar
Total
Percent
Examinations
Passilg
Passing
Colorado ......................................
230
129
56%
48 State Total ............................. 17,871
10,465
59%
PERCENTAGE PASSING BAR EXAMINATION DURING 1952
Rvpeaters
First Timers
Colorado ........
.........
................... 38%
64%
48 State Average ..................................... 40%
67%
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PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURESHOULD IT BE ABOLISHED IN COLORADO?
ROBERT D. CHARLTON
of the Denver Bar

Prior to the adoption by our Supreme Court of the Colorado
Rules of Civil Procedure (adopted January 6, 1941, effective April
6, 1941, see Volume 107, Colorado Reports following page 442 and
Rule 1 C (b)) much use of Rule 16 (pre-trial procedures; formulating issues) was predicted.
However, Percy Morris, Esquire, in his address No. 5 Appendix D, page 463, stated:
This rule prescribes an innovation in our practice
which, if put into effect by the judges and wisely administered by them, will prove to be one of the most beneficial
changes in procedure made by the rules. (Italics mine).
Much has been written and spoken by eminent and distinguished individuals about the benefits to be derived from its
effectual use. The late Judge J. Foster Symes of our Federal District Court, who was an ardent advocate and skilful user of the
procedure set up in the rule, made the most apt statement of its
objective and its benefits when he said in his article in Dicta of
May 1950 at page 463:
It (Pre-trial Procedure) will not succeed unless the
court is sympathetic with the new procedure, insists upon
its use and insists further, that the bar take it seriously.
And at page 164:
Its obvious advantage is the saving of time for litigants, counsel, and the court-by a frank discussion of the
law and facts in chambers after a case is at issue and
before trial. Each side is compelled to disclose witnesses,
what they will testify to, the legal theory upon which they
will proceed, and the legal points that will be raised in
the trial of the case which can be settled before trial.
These matters are discussed, and if the court wishes, it
can decide questions of law before the case goes to trial,
if a trial is necessary. In this way all elements of surprise are taken out of the case, and the issues are simplified so that they are thoroughly understood by the court
and jury. It prevents a law suit from being a contest
between counsel rather than between parties. Many lawyers object to this as they are fond of keeping their facts
a secret, springing a question of law, etc., at the trial
and taking the other side by surprise.
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Furthermore, when lawyers and litigants learn of
the other side's case by the use of pre-trial procedure,
they are not quite so sure of the strength of their own
position and are willing to talk compromise and settlement. My experience has been that many clients do not
make a full disclosure of the case to their counsel and
only tell him the facts favorable to their contentions.
They, as well as their counsel, are often surprised to learn
at pre-trial of the strength of their opponent's case. This
makes them more reasonable and willing to talk compromise when they learn there is a question as to the correctness of their position.
It is not my intention to decry, or reflect adversely, upon this
rule as we I are firm believers in its usefulness and are strong
advocates of the merits of the procedure set up in the rule. Nor do
I intend to try and report the attitudes of various lawyers, trial
judges, etc. with regard to the way the Rule is handled and practiced. T. Raber Taylor, Esquire, in his splendid article in Dicta,
May 1950, pages 157-163 has made a report of its use in the various
district courts up to that time. I have made no attempt to gather
any additional statistics from trial courts nor am I going to indulge in reporting any personal experiences in the trial courts.
I do, however, propose to indicate the fate that has attended
the rule as reported by our own Supreme Court decisions. For,
after all, the approval or disapproval of this Rule by our court
of last resort has determined whether or not the Rule will be
vigorously used by trial judges or land in the limbo of discarded
judicial junk.
When Mr. Morris made the statement referred to above, it
seemed to be his view that the success or failure depended upon
the trial judges, because in a later paragraph at page 464 he said:
Whether the pre-trial
practice at all is dependent
And the effectiveness of the
will depend both upon the
handles the conference and
the attorneys.

procedure is to be put into
entirely upon the trial court.
practice, when put into effect,
manner in which the judge
upon the attitude adopted by

This statement of course is a splendid statement, because by
the terms of the rule, the trial judge has discretion in putting the
rule into effect, but in the final .analysis the limits of approval or
disapproval of the actions of trial courts and their orders made
during the conference are ultimately set by the supreme court.
They are the "Judges" who have the ultimate responsibility, and,
perhaps their approval was taken for granted.
I Kenneth

W.

Robinson of the Denver Bar and myself.
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According to Volume 107, at the time of the adoption of the
Rule, the court was composed of the following individuals:
Benjamin C. Hilliard, Chief Justice
Francis E. Bouck
John C. Young
Norris C. Bakke
William L. Knous
Otto Bock
Haslett P. Burke.
It would appear from the proceedings that the adoption of
the rules was unanimous by the court.
The construction to be placed upon the rules is set forth in
plain, vigorous and unmistakable terms:
* . . They shall be liberally construed to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action.

Rule 1 C (a) Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure.
In Berryman v. Berryman,2 decided August 21, 1946, the
court, speaking through Mr. Justice Stone, in reversing the trial
court for sustaining a motion to dismiss a complaint in an action
for insufficient facts to state a claim in a case where a husband
set forth the usual allegations for divorce, but prayed for a limited
divorce (judicial separation), equitable division of property, and
"such other and further relief, etc." said at page 284:
Our new rules of civil procedure, adopted almost in
their entirety from the new federal rules, are intended
to simplify pleadings and to eliminate delay, . . . 'If wisely
administered, the Rules should do much to eliminate the
complaints of laymen and of lawyers alike as to the technicalities of the law, the subtleties of practice, and the
involvements of procedure. Their object must at all times
control-"to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action." '
And at page 286 at the end of the opinion:
Rules of procedure should serve to facilitate, not to
impede, the decision of cases on their merits.
This opinion, however, was not unanimous. Mr. Justice
Hilliard did not participate. Mr. Justice Bakke and Mr. Justice
Burke dissented and the ground for dissent by them is not stated.
Inasmuch as they were on the court at the time of the adoption, it
is assumed that their dissent was based on the legal question as to
whether or not the complaint in fact stated "a cause of action",
2 115 Colo. 281, 172 P. (2d)

446.
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and thus did not militate against the announced spirit of the rules
set forth in the opinion and in the rules themselves.
This decision appeared for a time to be a hopeful augury of
the future of the Rules in general, and particular rules from time
to time, as they had occasion to be scrutinized by our Supreme
Court in connection with cases brought to it for review.
In McKinley v. Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad
Company,3 a damage action, arising out of a shipment of sheep
from Presidio, Texas, to Mosca, Colorado, the defendant's line
having been the terminal carrier and in which the plaintiff suffered a directed verdict against him for failure to make out a case,
the Supreme Court said at page 207:
When the specific acts of negligence upon which
plaintiff relies are declared by him, whether in his complaint or at pre-trial conference or in any other manner,
it is the general rule that he is restricted thereby. He
must maintain this cause, if at all, by proof of the negligence so charged. No reason of surprise or excusable negligence appears to justify an exception here to the general
rule. (italics mine).
Although no claim of error was apparently made challenging
the pre-trial conference or any part of it in this case, nevertheless,
the opinion of our Supreme Court indicated some emphasis on the
proceedings at the pre-trial conference.
Nowithstanding these hopeful signs and on January 23, 1950,
the outlook changed. On that day Duffy v. Gross 4 wes decided.
This case was referred to in T. Raber Taylor's article and is well
briefed there.
Three years have now passed and Duffy v. Gross may well have
been either, for all practical purposes, the death knell of pre-trial
procedure in Colorado, or at least a postponement for some time
to come of its adequate and intended use. The composition of
the court was Benjamin C. Hilliard, Chief Justice, William S.
Jackson, Mortimer Stone, Frank L. Hays, Wilbur M. Alter, E. V.
Holland, and 0. Otto Moore. It seems to have been unanimous as
no dissent is noted. It can be seen, of course, from this roster
that the only Judge remaining on the court among those who
adopted the Rules was the then Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard. This
was an automobile accident case. The testimony was extensively
reviewed by the court. The presence or absence of a stop sign at
the collision intersection was a disputed question. The plaintiff
having recovered judgment, the defendant sought review, alleging
among other errors "that the court erred in its rulings in the
pre-trial conference." (This seems to be the first direct challenge
'119 Colo. 203, 201 P. (2d) 905, January 10, 1949.
1121 Colo. 198, 214 P. (2d) 498.
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of its kind in our court.) It appears that during the pre-trial
conference, counsel for defendant had requested the court to require plaintiff to "advise the court as to the acts of negligence
upon which they (plaintiffs) were proposing to rely." Counsel for
the plaintiffs objected, and stated that the request was not proper,
that it was a matter of proof and that this is a pre-trial conference to see what can be admitted; that they had alleged negligence,
and defendants had denied it so that is a question that is at issue.
The trial court sustained the plaintiff's objection. During the opening statement by counsel for plaintiffs, for the first time the basis
of the negligence asserted appeared, as counsel stated that plaintiffs expected to prove that there was a stop sign at the intersection. The Supreme Court held that the failure of the trial court
to direct plaintiffs to state the specific negligence relied upon at
the pre-trial conference was not prejudicial error. In considering
the court's opinion it may well be that the defendants were not
prompt and diligent in using other rules available to them to
ascertain this vital information. It appears at page 207 and the
Supreme Court made note of it that the defendants had not filed
any motion for a bill of particulars, nor employed any other means
to obtain a definite or particular statement of the items of specific negligence asserted by plaintiff 5 prior to the date set for trial.
Be that as it may, however, the following statement by the court
on page 209 is quite significant as indicating the view of our
Supreme Court:
Further discussion of the failure of the court to
compel plaintiffs to disclose the specific acts of negligence
upon which they relied, and which is the real basis of this
assignment of error, is not necessary other than to say
that the pre-trial conference rule is designed to expedite
trials when certain facts may be admitted and the necessity of proof thereof obviated. The proper courtesy of the
profession enables this to be done, usually in a few moments at the beginning of a trial, without pre-trial conference. Usually, obvious facts are admitted, but we see
nothing in the rule that is compulsory as to the disclosure
of the details of the issues to be made by the pleadings.
As to whether or not a pre-trial conference is to be called,
rests entirely in the discretion of the trial court and that
discretion abides throughout the procedure.
Naturally, no one can quarrel with the statement that the
calling of the pre-trial conference by the trial judge is discretion-

5 The fate of such a motion, at least in Denver, is well known; as to depositions, in Morris v. Redak, 124 Colo. 27, 234 P. (2d) 908, the court said at p. 41 that
such motions have been held to be luxurious in character and nontaxable as

costs.
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ary, because the rule says so specifically. However, it would seem
that once the discretion was exercised in favor of holding a pretrial conference that the trial court should be able to determine
fairly the real issues to be tried and thus compel a frank disclosure
of the proof, the applicable law and other details as mentioned by
Judge Symes in his article so that the conference would produce
results in accordance with the spirit of the rules. The statement
by counsel for the plaintiff that "this is a pre-trial conference to
see what can be admitted" which apparently was endorsed by the
trial judge, and ultimately approved by the supreme court is far
too narrow and overlooks the other aspects of the rule as stated
expressly by its wording, such as, the simplification of issues,
amendments, etc. The attitude of the Federal Courts is well stated
in Cherney v. Holmes :6
The first stated purpose of the pre-trial conference
under Rule 16, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28
U.S.C.A., is simplification of the issues; another purpose
is to obtain admission of facts and of documents without
further proof at the trial. Attorneys at a pre-trial conference owe a duty to the court and opposing counsel to
make a full and fair disclosure of their views as to what
the real issues at the trial will be. Rule 16 has done much
to eliminate sham and surprise in the preparation and trial
of cases in the federal courts. As was stated in Brown v.
Christman, 75 U.S. App. D. C. 203, 126 F. 2d 625, 631,
one of the results of fair disclosures at a pre-trial conference is to take cases from the realm of surprise and maneuvering whereby an unwary counsel might see the just
cause of his client lost.
In American National Insurance Company v. Gregg,7 which
also came up from Pueblo as the Duffy-Gross case did, from the
same trial judge (Honorable J. Arthur Phelps) again the Supreme
Court was called upon to determine whether or not Judge Phelps'
action at the pre-trial conference in refusing to require a plaintiff
to make additional specifications of the claim was right and again
the Supreme Court sustained the trial judge. It appears that this
was an action to recover from an insurance company on a policy
of insurance. The critical question was whether or not the policy
was in force at the time of death, and depended upon the effective
date of the policy. The date of the application for the insurance
was June 27, 1946; the date of the issuance of the policy was August
9, 1946; and the date of delivery, September 10, 1946. The insured
was killed in an airplane accident on March 30, 1947. By arrangement made with agent of the insurance company the premium

I (7th Circuit) 185 F. (2d) 718 at 721.
,123 Colo. 476, 231 P. (2d) 467 (1951).
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was actually paid for the first six months by the agent. The question to be determined by the trial judge was whether or not the
policy was in force because of the grace period of 31 days. If it
extended from the date of delivery of the policy it was in force,
otherwise not. Although the rules were in force from April 6, 1941,
and the trial commenced on February 24, 1948, the trial judge
referred to the rules as the "new rules." Although geologically
speaking, perhaps the term of seven years is not long; nevertheless, when one considers the amount of litigation which has ensued
in the courts of Colorado in such period it would seem that the
gloss of being "new" had then and certainly now rubbed off. In
Paragraph 4 of Plaintiff's complaint it was averred "That at the
time of the death of William Timothy Gregg all premiums due
and payable on said policy had been paid by one J. Q. Adams,
agent of defendant." Counsel for the company inquired how
plaintiff intended to prove these allegations and by whom. The
answer to this was that she expected to prove the allegations by
herself, one Virgil R. Carter and John Q. Adams, and by the allegations made in the defendant's answer and defendant's motion. The
counsel for the defendant insisted that the plaintiffs state the
specific allegations in defendants answer and motion that they
were relying upon. The trial court ruled that since plaintiff had
given the names of the three witnesses plus the defendant's answer
and motion she had sufficiently answered.
The Supreme Court said at page 483:
We cannot think the court erred, and assuredly defendant could not have been misled by the ruling... Considering the state of the pleadings, as we think, no mystery attended in the premises. The evidence given by the
witnesses mentioned, and particularly that of the agent
Adams, made certain that which already was clear.
The second error charged by the defendant related to whether
or not the plaintiffs intended to prove the agent had authority to accept other property pledged in payment of the premiums. The
Supreme Court held, that considering the record and the fact that
the agent had paid the premiums himself, based upon the arrangement with the insured, that this question was not pertinent. This
case, of course, neither helps nor hinders in determining the power
of the trial court under Rule 16, as the answers given certainly
seem sufficient. The opinion was by Judge Hilliard. Mr. Justice
Hays and Mr. Justice Moore concurred. Mr. Justice Alter concurred specially. The then Chief Justice, Judge Jackson, Mr. Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Holland dissented. The ground of dissent is not stated, consequently, we may assume that the pronouncement of the writer of the opinion as to the proceedings at
the pre-trial conference were accepted, and that the real basis of
the dissent was on the legal effect of the opinion as to the effective
date of the policy of the insurance.
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In Light v. Rogers,8 a case involving damages for breach of
contract in connection with the sale of real estate in which the
court applied again the parol evidence rule, decided February 18,
1952, the opinion by Mr. Justice Alter, reference was made to the
pre-trial proceedings without any discussion as to whether or not
the court committed error, and at page 211 of the report:
When the trial began, a question was propounded to
plaintiff on direct examination, to which defendants interposed an objection, whereupon the court ruled:
'As we stated in the pre-trial conference which we
have just concluded, and wherein we entered certain stipulations [no order reciting the action taken at the pre-trial
conference or the stipulations entered into thereat appear in the record as provided by Rule 16, R.C.P. Colo.],
we are running into a matter of law here upon which
there might be a serious controversy.'
However, it appeared that this question of law was reversed
for the trial, when it could have well been ruled upon at the pretrial conference and would have been of decisive effect. I realize,
of course, that the pre-trial conference should not be a substitute
for or held in lieu of the actual trial, but in the interest of attaining the objective stated by the rules it should determine what the
"real issues" are to be tried and if proof offered by a party is not
"legal" proof rulings should be made accordingly.
In McCoy v. District Court of Larimer County,9 the Supreme
Court made original proceedings in the nature of a writ of prohibition absolute against the trial court. This involved the question as to whether or not a party who had made a statement to an
investigator shortly after a collision could require his opponent to
submit for inspection such statement. The trial court observed that
the showing made by the party under Rule 34 was not sufficient,
but went on to say:
'However, the motion made was and is in connection
with pre-trial conference, and one purpose of pre-trial
conference is to aid in the disposition of the action, which
may well include, among other discovery mechanisms,
disclosure so that "civil trials need no longer be- carried
on in the dark by either party to them."'
While the Supreme Court held that the trial court could not
compel such disclosure and placed its decision primarily on the
failure of the party seeking inspection to show good cause under
Rule 34, nevertheless, it also disapproved the action of the trial
court in ordering inspection under Rule 16, saying:
125 Colo. 209, 242 P. (2d) 234.
'246 P. (2d) 619, June 23, 1952.
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[2] The district court apparently concluded that
the showing made in the instant case was insufficientunder Rule 34, R.C.P. Colo.-to justify an order to produce the documents, but concluded that, since the matter
arose in connection with the pre-trial conference the insufficiency of the showing might be disregarded. In this
conclusion the trial court erred. Rule 16, R.C.P. Colo.,
which provides for a pre-trial conference, does not confer
upon a trial court authority to compel the production of
any documents or force the making of any admissions.
Duffy v. Gross, 121 Colo. 198, 214 P. 2d 498. The only
section of said rule in which documents are specifically
mentioned, is to the effect that the court may order the
attorneys for the parties to appear before it for a conference to consider 'the possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents which will avoid unnecessary proof.' If in any case a litigant is entitled to the
production of documents he must bring himself within
the provisions of Rule 34, R.C.P. Colo.
It is noteworthy that Duffy v. Gross is cited as authority and
the court again emphasizes that Rule 16 does not confer upon the
trial court authority to compel or force the making. of any admission or the disclosure of a position. It would appear that the
channel in which pre-trial conferences may be charted is very
narrow indeed.
In Marsh v. Warren,10 an action for reformation of deeds, the
Supreme Court in reviewing the pre-trial order of the court below,
agreed with counsel for the defendant that the pre-trial order did
not bear the construction placed upon it by counsel for the plaintiffs.
Although the rules were adopted effective April 6, 1941, and
thus have been in effect for over twelve years, it possibly would
not be quite fair to take the whole period from April 6, 1941, to
date as a basis for the comparisons set forth hereinafter. Due to
the very nature of the drastic changes made by the rules, the fact
that many actions and proceedings were already on file in which
pleadings and issues were drafted and arrived at under the code
of civil procedure, it is fair to assume that a substantial period of
time elapsed before the full impact of the rules was felt. The fact
that many lawyers opposed the adoption of the rules is well known;
others had a tongue in cheek attitude. Indeed, since their adoption
there have been rumblings and rumors from the court itself that
the rules narrowly escaped rescission. It may, therefore, be interesting to note that commencing with Volume 112 of the Colorado Reports, (January, April and September terms 1944, published in 1945) and ending with the last Volume No. 125 (Septem"248

P. (2d) 825, September 22, 1952.
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ber 1951, January and April terms 1952) published in 1953, practically a ten-year period, the court has decided 1,218 cases including those disposed of without written opinion. Of these, 164
involve criminal law and 41 industrial commission cases. Estimating another ten per cent for cases in which no pre-trial conference
was necessary or could be had, such as proceedings in the nature
of special writs, etc., it is probably not unreasonable to conclude
that there were approximately 900 civil cases in which pre-trial
would have been profitable and may, or may not have been held,
depending, of course, on the rule in the District. It is somewhat
startling to note that our court has decided two cases in which
the pre-trial proceedings were directly challenged (but approved)
and in two others have made a reference to it. While I made no
attempt to determine the number of cases decided by our court
since the publication of Volume 125 we do have two additional decisions, one in which the pre-trial procedure was directly questioned and disapproved and the other in which there was a reference to it.
On the other hand Rule 15, relating to amendments and supplemental pleadings have been the subject of consideration at
least 27 times, according to Shepherd's Citator for Colorado.
It appears to me as a justifiable conclusion that if no power
is to be confided to the trial court under Rule 16 to compel a full,
frank and fair disclosure of the position of each party to the end
that the issues be simplified, and
to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of every action (Rule 1 C (a))
that the rule ought to be rescinded, because as it now stands under
the decisions of our court, it is just another date on the calendar.

LAYMAN'S LANGUAGE
We learn from an ad on page 108 of the New Yorker magazine for September 19, 1953 that for one dollar it is possible to
buy a book on divorce and marriage laws which "Helps you understand advice of your attorney." Not so amusing are the number
of people who vainly request the Denver Lawyer Referral Service
to refer them to an attorney who can explain advice which they
have already received from another attorney. Even more serious
are the charges of professional misconduct which reach the Grievance Committee of the Bar Association because an attorney failed
to advise a client of delays which might arise in his litigation, or
that a money judgment is not the same as money in a bank or that
payment of an attorney's fee does not insure success in court.
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THE EXPERT ON FOREIGN LAW*
GEORGE S. CARTERt

Courts of one state do not, as a general rule, take judicial
notice of the law of a foreign country. Ordinarily, when a litigant
relies upon such foreign law as the basis of his claim or defense,
he must plead and prove it.'
The methods of such proof are stated as follows in Rule 44,
C (f), Colo. Rules of Civil Procedure.
A printed copy of a statute, or other written law....
of a foreign country, or a printed copy of a proclamation,
edict, decree or ordinance by the executive power thereof,
contained in a book or publication purporting or proved to
have been published by the authority thereof, or proved
to be commonly admitted as evidence of the existing law
in the judicial tribunals thereof, is presumptive evidence
of the statute, law proclamation, edict, decree or ordinance. The unwritten or common law . . . of a foreign
country, may be proved as a fact by oral evidence. The
books of report of cases adjudged in the courts thereof
must also be admitted as presumptive evidence of the unwritten or common law thereof ....
(Italics supplied).
Thus Rule 44 (f) prescribes different methods of proof depending upon whether the law to be proven is written or unwritten. However, even as to the written law, the method prescribed is not the only one possible.
In Mosko v. Matthews,2 the Colorado Supreme Court-construing Sec. 396 of the Code of Civil Procedure, predecessor of Rule
44C (f) -held that the provisions of the code relating to proof of
foreign laws do not prescribe exclusive methods of such proof, at
least in absence of seasonable objection, and that the statutes of a
"foreign" state (Oklahoma) were sufficiently proven by the testimony of a duly licensed practicing attorney of that state when
such testimony was uncontradicted.
But even when the text of the foreign statute is before the
court, it must have help from expert witnesses. In the words of
Dean Wigmore :3
No one doubts that the aid of a mere translator is
proper. But when a translation, if necessary, has been
made, is anything further allowable in the way of comment
* This article will be limited to the necessary qualifications of an expert
witness, called to prove by oral testimony or by affidavit the existence or the
meaning of a foreign law, i.e. the law of a foreign country, not that of a sister
state.
t Student, University of Denver College of Law.
220 Am. Jur., Sec. 178.
2 87 Colo. 55, 284 Pac. 1021 (1930).
17 NVYIG-IORE ON EVIDENCE, Sec. 1953 (3d ed. 1940).
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on the text? The answer has always and properly been
that such aid may at any time be needed and may always
be offered. (Citing cases).
Assuming then that expert witnesses are needed to prove both
written and unwritten foreign law, we come to our problem: who
can properly qualify as an expert on foreign law?
Having found no Colorado case directly in point, we shall
have to consider the decisions of other jurisdictions.
As stated by Dean Wigmore, 4 "the main controversy is
whether a witness to foreign law must be by profession an advocate, attorney, or judge, or whether a layman, if he claims the
knowledge, may be trusted to speak as to the state of the law."
There is little doubt in our courts that a practicing attorney
of a foreign jurisdiction (country) will qualify as an expert of
the particular law.
FEDERAL COURTS:

In Slater v. Mexican National Railroad Company,5 where the
wife and children of a citizen of Texas fatally injured in Mexico
through the negligence of a Colorado corporation brought suit
based on the laws of Mexico, the Supreme Court of the United
States held in effect that the admission in evidence of the statutes
of a foreign country does not preclude the use, upon any matter
open to reasonable doubt, of the deposition of a lawyer of that
country, respecting the accepted and proper construction of such
statutes. Said Mr. Justice Holmes:
The defendant offered the deposition of a Mexican
lawyer as to the Mexican law. This was rejected, subject
to exception, seemingly on the ground that the agreed
translation of the statute was the best evidence. So no
doubt they were (sic), so far as they went, but the testimony of an expert as to the accepted or proper construction of them is admissible upon any matter open to reasonable doubt.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held O
that the law of Cuba was not sufficiently proven by the introduction in evidence of excerpts from its written laws, and that its
construction by the Cuban Courts should have been proved by the
testimony of a lawyer of that country.
In Hartzell v. United States,7 the testimony of a member of
the London, England, bar was admitted to identify certain statutes
of England.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held in
Shapleigh v. Mier,8 that the law of Mexico
4 op. cit., Sec. 564.
5 194 U.S. 120, (1904).
'In re International Mahogany Co., 147 Fed. 147, (1906).
72 F. 2d 569 (8th Cir., 1934) (cert, den. 293 U.S. 621).
S83 F. 2d 673 (1936) (aff'd 299 U.S. 468).
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is foreign law to be proven as a fact when written by
production of copies of the Constitution and statutes, and
in other respects by the testimony of experts. The writing
are to be construed by the judge as other writings in evidence, but if uncertain in meaning or application evidence
of experts is again admissible to aid the construction.
The court however does not tell us what it means by "expert".
But as the opinion cites, among other cases, Slater v. Mexican Nat.
R. Co., supra, we assume that it had an attorney admitted to the
Mexican Bar in mind.
In a fairly recent case 9 the United States Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit seems to have been rather strict in its requirements
concerning the qualifications of an expert witness. Said the Court:
For us, Argentine law is a fact. With respect to that
fact, defendant introduced the testimony of an expert witness. He is an American and a member of the New York
Bar, and of the Bars of Cuba and Puerto Rico. He studied
civil law for forty years. He has a degree of Doctor of
Civil Laws from the University of Havana. He was a
judge in Puerto Rico for seven years, and a member for
two years of a commission that drafted new legislation
for Cuba. He had studied Argentine law, and is the
author of a digest of that law appearing in the Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory.... He is authorized to practice in no Latin-American countries except Cuba, but can
give advice in other such countries .

.

. The judge is not

bound to accept the testimony of a witness concerning the
meaning of the laws of a foreign country, especially when,
as here, the witness had never practiced in that country.
It is a little hard to see why the admission or the lack of admission to practice in the foreign country should make any difference as to the weight of the expert's testimony, where-as herethe expert seems to be better qualified than most members of the
Bar of the particular foreign country. Unless the court only meant
to say what is true, in general, as to all expert testimony, i.e. that
it is just one kind of evidence and that the judge is not bound to
follow it.
STATE COURTS:

Some state decisions throw even more light on our problem
than the federal cases just cited.
Thus in an early case 10 a Spanish lawyer, who had practiced
law in Cuba, and at the time of the trial was an attorney in New
York, was allowed to testify as to the laws regulating partnership
in Cuba.
The South Carolina Supreme Court, in an action in South
Usatorre v. The Victoria, 172 F. 2d 434 (2nd Cir., 1949).
' 0 Barrows v. Downs, 9 R.I. 446 (1870).
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Carolina based upon a tort allegedly committed in Mexico, held a
deposition of a Mexican lawyer, who had practiced law for 50 successive years. in Mexico, construing sections of the Mexican Civil
Code in evidence which the trial judge deemed applicable on question of liability, competent to prove Mexican law."
In Pringle v. Gibson, 2 the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
said in a dictum that an expert is "a competent witness learned in
the law of that jurisdiction." No mention of being a member of the
Bar was made, and it does not appear from the opinion as reported
whether the expert testifying in the case was a member of the
Canadian Bar, the law of Canada ha~ing been in issue.
Two recent cases before the District Court of Appeals, Second
District, Division 1, California, involved questions of proof of
foreign law. In People v. McGrath (In re Miller's Estate) ,'13 three
experts on German law were called. The first was a German national.
He studied law in this country at Harvard and Columbia Law Schools and in 1907 was appointed a judge of the
County Court at Berlin where he served for a year and a
half. For the next 10 years he was an assistant in both
the Prussian Department of Justice and the Federal Department of Justice and also a Justice of the Court of
Appeals of Berlin ... From 1932 he practiced law in Berlin until approximately the time of trial herein...
The second expert was
since 1939 the Foreign Law Librarian of the Los Angeles
County Law Library, who received a Doctor of Laws
degree at the University of Wuerzburg in 1933, then entered the Bavarian State Preparatory Service for Jurists
in 1933 ...
The third expert
had studied at the Universities of Berlin, Freiburg, and
Breslau, had experience in law offices, with the public
prosecutor, and then passed an examination which entitled him to become a judge or a practicing attorney
...
practiced law in Germany for many years ...
No question was being raised, and none could have been, as to
the qualification of these experts.
However, in the other case before the same court, 14 one of the
above three experts testified as to Norwegian law. The foreign
law librarian of the Los Angeles County Law Library
testified that he was a graduate of the University of
Wuerzburg, Germany, where he received his Doctor of
Rauton v. Pullman Co., 191 S.E. 416, 183 S.C. 495 (1937).
-2195 A. 695, 135 Me. 297, reh. den. 197 A. 553, 135 Me. 512 (1937).
230 P. 2d 667 (1951).
1' Comstock v. Johnson, 223 P. 2d 105 (1950).
"

13
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Laws and Referendar degrees covering German Law and
Civil Law; that in his capacity as foreign law librarian he
was asked questions concerning foreign law (in different
courts) ... that he was familiar in general with the law of
Norway . .. He further testified that he had never lived
in Norway; that he did not speak the Norwegian language
...
that he could read with the aid of a dictionary Norwegian ...
The court held that
the qualification of a witness to testify as an expert is a
matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and
where there is no showing of a clear abuse of that discretion, the ruling of that court will not be disturbed on appeal (citing cases), nor will the ruling be disturbed if
there is any substantial evidence to support it (citing
cases). In view of the qualifications of (the expert) as
hereinabove set forth, this court cannot say as a matter
of law that a clear abuse of discretion occured in the
trial court. And while residence within the jurisdiction
of Norway and firsthand observation of the customs of
the country might go to the weight of (the expert's) testimony, it does not go to its admissibility and the position of appellant that the lack thereof disqualified (the
witness) as expert witness is untenable. (Italics supplied.)
The Supreme Court, Special Term, New York County went
rather far in 1939 15 by accepting "an affidavit of an experienced
German lawyer" as to the powers of a certain official in Germanoccupied Czechoslovakia. "In the absence of proof to controvert
this statement of the law," said the court, "the Court will accept
it as a fact." The great advantage of possible cross-examination
of the expert does not exist, of course, when affidavits are used,
but this question lies outside the limited scope of this article.
The Supreme Court of Onondoga County (New York), in a
good orthodox case, 16 accepted the testimony of a "witness who
had been admitted to and practiced as a barrister in the Kingdom
of Italy ... as to the meaning and import of (the) Italian Statute".
Some 20 years earlier, the Appellate Division of the New
York Supreme Court held that an expert on foreign law need not
necessarily be a lawyer. In Masocco v. Schaaf,1 7 where the validity
of an Italian religious marriage was in issue, one party introduced
the testimony of a New York attorney who "stated that he has
familiarized himself with the Italian law, but who apparently has
not been admitted to practice in Italy"; the deposition of a solicitor and barrister in Italy; the deposition of another witness who
"Stern v. S. S. Steiner, Inc., 12 N.Y.S. 2d 44 (1939).
"Fusco v. Fusco, 107 N.Y.S. 2d 286 (1951).
1-254 N.Y.S. 439, 234 App. Div. 181 (1931).
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had served as vice consul and holds the degree of doctor of law
from the University of Milano, and the deposition of an Italian
avvocato. The other party called the secretary of the Italian consulate of the city of Buffalo as a witness, who "testified that he
knew the Italian law very well, but was not a lawyer; that he was
familiar with the requirements of a legal marriage in Italy," etc.
The court said, inter alia:
Whether, in any case a witness is qualified to speak
as an expert is a fact to be determined by the courts upon
the trial preliminary to his testifying, and ordinarily the
decision of the trial court on this point, when there are
any facts to support it, is not open to review in this
court... The witness (the secretary of the consulate) in
his official capacity, was competent to testify and express
an opinion as to the validity of the marriage in question.
His official duties naturally require considerable familiarity with Italian law affecting persons of Italian nationality
and residence, rendering him peculiarly qualified to speak.
And the court further stated that the opinion of the first
party's witnesses has no more weight than the opinion of the
second party's witness, i.e. the secretary of the Consulate.
The Court of Appeals of Ohio, Cuyahoga County, made an
interesting pronouncement as to the weight to be accorded to such
expert testimony. In Olijan v. Lublin,18 it said:
Instead of producing printed copies of the particular (Yugoslav) statutes relied upon, she (plaintiff) called
as a witness one X, a member of the Bar of Akron, Ohio,
who has never been admitted to the practice of law in the
Kingdom of Yugoslavia. This witness was permitted to
testify as to his opinion of what the rules of law are in
Yugoslavia as to the recording of vital statistics. This
method of establishing the laws of a foreign country is
permissible if the witnesses called are qualified. The
testimony which was given to support the qualifications
of Mr. X is, to say the least, meager. Having visited
Yugoslavia for two short periods of time and having
scanned a law book or two at the Yugoslav Embassy in
Washington would hardly qualify even a practitioner at
the Ohio Bar as an expert on the laws of such foreign
country. The witness' testimony is therefore of little or
no value whatever. Generally, one who is presented as
an expert to testify as to the law of another state or foreign country, is a practitioner of that state or country
or because of his position he has had a reasonable opportunity to acquaint himself with its provisions.
,50

N.E. 2d 264, (1943).
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There are a few other cases on the subject, but to cite them
would not seem to add anything new to the picture.
In conclusion, it may be stated that (1) the qualifications of
the expert on foreign law must be established to the satisfaction
of the trial court, (2) a witness who is or has been a practicing
attorney in the foreign jurisdiction, the law of which is to be
proven, is generally competent, and (3) even a layman can testify
if he appears to the satisfaction of the court to be well informed
as to the foreign law in question.

LEGISLATION CAUSES CHANGES IN
COUNTY COURT RULES
The Denver County Court, of its own motion, has made
changes in its Rules which became effective on June 1, 1953. These
amendments are set out below.
The amendment to Section 2 of Rule X, is a direct result of
the passage of Senate Bill No. 221, amending Section 217 of Ch.
176 and the same sort of rule is expected to be adopted by other
county courts throughout the state. As is apparent, both amendments were made in an effort to cooperate with the Attorney General's Office.
1. Section 2 of Rule X is amended by the addition of the
following paragraph:
Whenever in a decedent's estate it appears that there
is an unknown heir, legatee or devisee, or that the whereabouts of any heir, legatee or devisee is unknown, or that
there is no person qualified to receive a legacy, bequest
or distributive share from the estate, then a copy of the
final report of the fiduciary shall be served on the Attorney General of the State of Colorado, in person or
by registered mail, and the Attorney General shall have
ten days within which to file objections thereto.
2. The following rule is added:
Rule XXIV. NOTICE REQUIRED WHERE NONRESIDENCY ALLEGED.
Whenever a petition is filed requesting probate of
an alleged foreign will, or whenever a petition is filed
requesting transfer of a lodged will to another jurisdiction (or whenever in any other probate proceeding in
this court an allegation of non-residency is material to
the relief sought), a copy of such petition shall be served
on the Attorney General of the State of Colorado by
the petitioner, in person or by registered mail, and the
Attorney General shall have ten days within which to
file written objections.
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REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICES-COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION*
LAWRENCE A. LONG, Chairmzan

People v. William G. Newer-March 1952
People v. Lloyd L. Brown--August 1952
People v. D. W. Schmidt dba Nat. Pure Trust
Serv.-December, 1952
People v. N. Mark Hanna-June1953
People v. Lucas Woodall-July 1953
The foregoing cases are all actions taken on original proceedings in the Colorado Supreme Court. Citations were issued and in
the first four instances the court found the offender guilty and
assessed either reprimand or fine, or both. As of the date of this
report, the Woodall action is undisposed of and one similar such
action is being studied.
Surely the above should tend to discourage the unauthorized
practice of law in Colorado. All of these cases were brought by
the Attorney General's office, whose cooperation and assistance
has been a source of strength to the Committee. While we have
won these there is no assurance that we can win everyone that we
bring. These are only a few of the items handled; they represent
only actions in our Supreme Court. Other complaints have been
successfully handled by the Committee without the necessity of
court intervention. This has been accomplished by correspondence
or personal contact or both. In most instances reasoning produces
cooperation and results. The Committee feels that excellent progress has been accomplished, especially towards enjoining the unauthorized practices of certain Justices of the Peace, realtors, morticians, accountants and others. Recently a better understanding
was reached between the Committee and a number of bond and
brokerage houses resulting in their voluntarily withdrawing objectionable language used in magazine advertisements. They had
advertised that they would furnish all legal services for municipal
bond work, etc. The practice has been eliminated and, we believe,
some goodwill established.
We are pleased to report that after much delay we have received a trial date for the five cases brought jointly by the Colorado
and Denver Bar Associations' Committees on unauthorized practice against the abstract and real estate companies.' The week of
* Published
Association.
I Bar Assn.
Bar Assn.
Bar Assn.
Bar Assn.
Bar Assn.

at the direction of the Board of Governors of the Colorado Bar
v. Record Abstr. & Title Co.-Civil No. A69765, Div. 5.
v. The Title Guarantee Co.-Civil No. A69766, Div. 1.
v. Conway-Bogue Rlty. Invest. Co.-Civil No. A76392, Div. 5.
v. Van Schaack & Co.-Civil No. A76393, Div. 3.
v. John F. Bruno-Civil No. A76394, Div. 4.
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November 30, December 1, 2, 3 and 4 has been assigned. The cases
will be tried in Denver by Judge J. Arthur Phelps, of the Tenth
Judicial District. The first two of these five cases were started in
April, 1950. We are anxious to have these cases, or even one of
them before the Supreme Court before another year has elapsed.
There now begins to look as if such might be possible.
A word of warning and the attention of all lawyers in Colorado should be directed to another and comparatively new encoachment. Since oil has become of increasing importance locally,
instruments known as "Certificates of Title", "Memorandum of
Title" and the like, have been cropping up. These are actually a
type of mail-order, title opinion in modified, printed or mimeographed form. They sell for an average of $10.00, are generally
provided by abstract or title companies and are intended to give a
quick, thumb-nail, condensed form of opinion without the expense
of either an abstract or a lawyer's opinion. A letter stating that
in general these "Certificates" were "opinion" and should not be
used by corporations or laymen went out to all seventy-five abstract companies in Colorado. Some complied, some ignored, some
volunteered cooperation and some submitted other forms asking
for approval. These inquiries have been referred to our Real
Estate Standards Committee. We are further concerned lest the
use of these "Certificates of Title" or "Memorandums of Title"
might spread to the general public resulting in cut-rate, inadequate
and worthless title opinions. We predict that unless this phase of
the Committee's work is pursued vigorously during the coming
year the use of the "Certificates" will become wide-spread, resulting in what should be apparent to every lawyer.
Another problem of increasing importance is the program of
propaganda apparently initiated by some title insurance companies and circulated through real estate channels to the effect
that attorney's title opinions are obsolete, of no value, unacceptable
to the better leading agencies, banks and insurance companies;
that they are an antiquated way of doing business and are greatly
inferior to a title insurance policy. Of course, the innocent victim
does not realize that when an abstract is demanded of him in the
future he may have to produce one or lose his sale; nor does he
realize that a title insurance company may not insure his title
until he perfects it for them himself and all but guarantees the
title. To classify title insurance as a "racket" would be going too
far, but when title insurance companies openly try to mislead the
public it is past time for our Association to strike back.
Statistically, more complaints were serviced this year than
in the past several years and this is significant. It points to the
fact that interest, cooperation and effort have been focused by the
lawyer on this problem. It does not necessarily mean that the
number of offenses are increasing. It is the belief of this Committee that the most effective way to stamp out the unauthorized
practice of law is to drive home with certainty and action, a con-
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tinuous, well-publicized effort. Every publicized result, whether
partially or wholly successful, is a warning and deterrent to all
who would venture into our profession. As a matter of public interest, we must stop the unqualified from misleading, misinforming
and duping the public. From what we know of the offenses we see
we have reason to believe that a matter of concern would be the
offenses of which we have no knowledge or do not see.
Accordingly, your Committee recommends that our Public Relations Committee carry to the public by every media at its command a program designed to:
(a) Make the public realize that our activities are in the
public interest.
(b) Make the public continually aware of our interest and
activity.
(c) Correct and explain with truth that propaganda concerning title insurance versus legal opinions on abstract examinations as hereinbefore mentioned.
Perhaps the writer tends to emphasize too greatly the unauthorized practice phase of the Association's activities, but I believe it is indisputable that continued encroachments, new types
of offenses, accelerated business methods, and an increasing awareness of the problem present a direct threat to our profession. The
volume of work of this Committee is too great to expect satisfactory
results from them without the assistance of an assistant or special
investigator. If such an employment cannot be secured on at
least a part-time basis then surely funds should be made available
for the employment when needed. His services could be used in
conjunction with the Grievance Committee, which I am reliably
informed has possible access to funds accumulated under Rule 229
of the Rules for Admission To The Bar. That rule allows expenditures from the fund for "disciplinary" matters, and includes, in
my judgment, unauthorized practice of law offenses. Quite often
there is a connection between matters of unauthorized practice and
grievance offenses.
In conclusion the Committee wishes to extend its sincere
thanks to the members of the Bar throughout the State not only
for their interest but, in many instances, for their active assistance.
JEFFERSON COUNTY LAWYERS COMPLAIN
The following appeal has been made by the Jefferson County
Bar Association; "The Jefferson County District Court Library
needs Colorado Reports volumes 3, 10, 43, 82, and 104 and also
Colorado Digest volume 13, all of which probably have been swiped
or borrowed by Denver lawyers, we out here in Jefferson County
all being innocent country lambs." Donors or sellers are invited
to contact Judge Osmer E. Smith who was not the author of this
libelous request.
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A TIMELY REPORT ON MES VS. KHAY DECIDED
BY THE GREAT QENBET CIRCA 1300 B. C.
A. NONYMOUS
of the Denver Bar

I have read our Secretary's call for material to fill the pages of
Dicta, and noted his suggestion that many briefs which lawyers
prepare would make excellent articles. Now I have just started to
brief the matter of Alteration of Public Land Records. (I know
the mere thought of such records being altered can cause title examiners to leap from peaceful slumber screaming with horrid
nightmares. But let them scream. They've made me scream too.)
Of course, a careful and thorough lawyer reads every case on the
subject he is briefing, from earliest times through the latest advance sheets. This I propose to do, but our Secretary's need is so
obviously pressing that I hasten to tender this first installment
covering all the cases on this point decided from the flood thru
1300 B.C.
The most pertinent, and to be honest, the only case I have run
into is Mes v. Khay. It is reported on a wall inside the tomb of one
Mes near Sakkara, Egypt. Even a meticulous researcher might
easily overlook this authority for it has been omitted from the
digests. Fortunately, the report has been translated and is now
accessible in UntersuchungenZur Geschichte und Altertumskuende
Agyptens, (J. C. Hinrichs, Leipsig 1905) and Sources of Ancient
and Primitive Law (Kocourek and Wigmore, Little Brown & Co.
1915), both of which are out of print. If you wish to cite this
authority, you had better just refer to XXX Dicta p. 391.
Now for the case. It seems a gentleman known as "overseer of
vessels Neshi" did some favors for Amosis I, founder of the 18th
dynasty, along about 1550 B.C., and, as a reward, was given a
hunpet consisting of about 78 arourae of land. His heirs farmed
it for several generations and then, in the 59th year of Horemheb,
the land was partitioned among six heirs, one of whom was Mrs.
Urnero. Her only son, the scribe Hui, married a Miss Nubnofret.
They had one child who was Mes and promptly got into one.
The scribe Hui died, and in the 18th year of Rameses II, Mes
and his mother Nubnofret came to till the land. They found it in
the possession of the Administrator Khay. They threw him off
and that's where they ran into trouble, because Khay had a pal,
the priest of the litter Amenemiopet, who was a kind of investigating officer for the Great Qenbet which was the nisi prius court in
those parts. Khay laid a plaint in the Great Qenbet, claiming that
he and his brothers and sisters had inherited the land from their
uncle, the chief of stables Hui, and that Mes' father, the scribe
Hui, had grabbed the property without any title. Huis must have
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been pretty common thereabouts, because one of the witnesses who
appeared later was the chief of auxiliaries Hui.
Amenemiopet supplied a false register to Khay to support his
claim, and apparently altered the public records back several generations to conform with Khay's yarn about the devolution of the
title.
The case came on for hearing before the Vizier of the Great
Qenbet at Helipolis, and Mes and Nubnofret unrolled their "testimonies" showing a chain of title all the way down from Neshi, but
the Vizier said to them: "These documents were written by one of
the two parties." So this evidence was excluded on the ground
that it consisted of mere self-serving documents prepared by one
of the litigants.
Then Nubnofret said to the Vizier: "Let there be brought to
me the two registrars from the Treasury and likewise from the
Department of the Granary," And the Vizier said to her: "Very
good is that which you say." And they all went down-stream to
Per-Ramessu and entered the Treasury of Pharoah, and likewise
into the Department of the Granary of Pharaoh, and they brought
the two registers before the Vizier in the Great Genbet. Then the
Vizier said to Nubnofret: "Who is your heir among the heirs who
are upon the two registers that are in our hand?" And Nubnofret
said: "There is no heir in them." "Then you are in the wrong"
said the Vizier to her.
So the Vizier summoned the priest of the litter Amenemiopet
and sent him forth saying: "Call together the heirs, and show them
the lands, and make a division for them." Amenemiopet probably
got his cut at this stage of the game. It is a safe bet that he got a
deeper cut later on in the region of the epiglottis.
Things looked mighty black for Mes and Nubnofret at this
point, but Mes wasn't licked yet. He appealed the case by laying
a plaint before the Vizier of the Great Qenbet at Memphis, and
that court sent a member or commissioner to the lands of Neshi
to examine the litigants and their witnesses. This testimony taken
on the spot substantiated Mes' claim and was all carefully recorded
by the scribe. Some of the key witnesses testified as follows:
What was said by the Priest of the Temple of Ptah: "By
Amon and by the Prince, I speak in truth and I speak not falsely;
and if I speak falsely, may my nose and my ears be cut off, and may
I be transported to Kush. I knew the scribe Hui, the son of Urnero.
He cultivated his lands from year to year and he cultivated them
saying: 'I am the son of Urnero the (descendant) of Neshi.' "
What was said by the honey-maker of the Treasury of
Pharaoh:
"By Amon and by the Prince, if I speak falsely, may my nose
and my ears be cut off and may I be transporated to Kush. The
scribe Hui was the son of Urnero; and moreover Urnero was the
(descendant) of Neshi."
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You will have noted that the form of oath, hopefully designed
to discourage perjury, refers to a place called Kush which is not
listed in Rand & McNally's atlas. This area was well south in fairly
dark Africa. Khartoum, where General Gordon came to serious
grief some 3,185 years later, is out that way.
The dweller in the town of Peihay took a pretty namby-pamby
kind of oath. He said "By Amon, and by the Prince, if I speak
falsely, may I be sent to the back of the house. The scribe Hui was
the son of Urnero, etc. ..."
The Administrator Khay testified too and gave his version of
the facts, but he was careful not to stick his neck out in his oath.
He just said: "And if . . .it is not the truth, then let me be put
to confusion."
Khay undoubtedly was put to confusion because, in addition
to this testimony, a new examining officer, the priest of the litter
Iniy, was sent out who called together the heirs of Neshi with the
notables of the town, and took their depositions. He apparently
reported in favor of Mes, too.
It may be considered unfortunate that the strength of this
decision as an authority is somewhat impaired by the fact that the
only extant report of the case ends this way:
"Judgment of the Court
"Now after ......
Here the inscription comes to an end.

DIAMOND JUBILEE MEETING OF A.B.A.
The Boston meeting of the American Bar Association, celebrating the Association's 75th anniversary, was the biggest meeting of lawyers ever held in the U. S., and one of the best planned
and organized, most eventful and spirited, in all ABA history.
Even the weather was exceptional-mostly cool and clear, with
only one 15-minute shower during the week.
Actual registrations were 4,532, almost four hundred above
the previous high mark for ABA Annual Meeting attendance.
There were big crowds at every Assembly session. Several luncheons and special events had sell-out and turn-away crowds. The
scintillating annual banquet drew over 1,600 and many had to be
seated in rooms off the main hall.
More than 20,000 attended the special star-light concert by
members of the Boston Symphony Orchestra, Arthur Fiedler conducting, in the Charles River Esplanade. The concert was arranged
and financed by the Boston and Massachusetts Bar Associations.
In addition to the symphony concert, other special events
made the convention week outstanding.
The Commemorative Stamp ceremony was a smashing success, with more than a million ABA stamps sold in Boston alone
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on Aug. 24 and over 100,000 "first day" cancellations at the special
post office substation set up in the Statler hotel lobby.
Starting with President Storey's annual address at the opening Assembly session, and concluding with the final day disposal
of resolutions, the sessions of the Assembly and House of Delegates made headline news across the country. The House, under
the experienced direction of Chairman David F. Maxwell of
Philadelphia, disposed of a crowded calendar of work in which
the following were among the highlights:
REAFFIRMED the Association's position in support of the Constitutional Amendment (Bricker) to re-define the treaty-powers
of the President. Former ABA President Frank E. Holman of
Seattle was awarded the ABA Medal for "conspicuous and unselfish service to the cause of American jurisprudence" in recognition of his role in clarifying this great constitutional issue for the
American people.
VOTED TO EXTEND and broaden the Association's fight against
Communism, approving a report by the special committee headed
by former U. S. Senator Herbert O'Conor of Maryland urging
that lawyers who are members of the Communist party or espouse
its doctrines be barred from practice.
APPROVED A NEW "Statement of Principles" governing disciplinary procedures, promulgated by a special committee under
the chairmanship of former U. S. Senator Forrest C. Donnell of
Missouri. The next step will be the formulation of a model disciplinary code for the guidance of the several states.
APPROVED A REPORT by the special Committee on Individual
Rights, headed by Whitney North Seymour of New York in which
ABA went on record as upholding the principle of freedom to read
and against "book burning ;" restated the duty of lawyers to represent accused persons in unpopular causes, providing they adhere
to the canons of conduct; authorized the committee to study the
protection of individual rights in Congressional inquiries, without
interfering or restricting in any way the investigative process
itself.
RECEIVED AN ANNOUNCEMENT by President Storey and Justice Robert H. Jackson of the U. S. Supreme Court that the Ford
Foundation had made a $50,000 planning grant to launch the
ABA's long-range study of the administration of criminal justice
in the United States.
NOT ONLY THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, but the Assembly as well,
produced front-page news nationally. The addresses of Secretary
of State Dulles and Attorney General Brownell were broadcast
coast to coast, as was Justice Jackson's address on criminal justice before the dinner for the judiciary. Secretary Dulles' address
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was a major foreign policy pronouncement in which he expounded
the administration's views on the Bricker amendment, and cited
weaknesses which he said time has revealed in the structure of UN.
Attorney General Brownell's declaration that the Department of
Justice was calling upon the National Lawyers' Guild to show
cause why it should not be placed' on its subversive organizations
list elicited applause in the Assembly, and cheers in the nation's
press.
In a network television appearance, and in his acceptance address at the annual banquet, newly-elected President William J.
Jameson of Billings, Mont., made one thing clear: he has "No personal program-no personal project to advocate and emphasize."
"I do promise my best efforts in cooperation with all of you in
the advancement of the program of the Association as determined
by the House of Delegates ... The time has come when we should
consolidate our present program and to make it more effective, and
we should not undertake new projects which are not necessary."
The completion of the American Bar Center, and the implementation of the work of the Survey of the Legal Profession, should
receive primary emphasis in the coming year, he added.

DENVER LAWYER RECEIVES AWARD
Thomas A. Gilliam of the Denver Bar was recently awarded
the National Municipal Law Review Award for 1935 for the best
article on an optional subject in the field of municipal law. The
award was announced by Charles J. Rhyne at the annual meeting
of the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers. The article,
which won for Mr. Gilliam a prize of $250, was entitled "Unsafe
Buildings" and dealt with legal techniques in ridding a community
of obsolete structures.
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